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Background – The implementation of electronic health records (EHRs) requires careful preparations 
but may still cause trouble. In this study we focus on one EHR – Epic. 
Purpose – We compare the experiences from implementing Epic in the UK and Denmark with the 
preparations for implementing it in Norway. 
Method – The study is based on document analysis (UK and Denmark) and interviews (Norway). 
Results – Epic had a troubled start in both the UK and Denmark with malfunctions in the interfaces to 
other clinical systems, disruptions in the continuity of care, and drops in performance. While the state 
of routine use has subsequently been reached in the UK, the transition process is still ongoing in 
Denmark. In Norway experiences from, especially, Denmark are heeded in planning the 
implementation of Epic, which is expected to deliver better care more efficiently. We discuss six 
pitfalls to achieving these benefits. 
Conclusion – Experiences from, especially, Denmark inform the Norwegian preparations, but these 
experiences point toward more challenges than solutions. The implementation of Epic in Norway is 
currently in a state of considerable uncertainty. 
Keywords: electronic health records, adoption, implementation.  
 
1 Introduction 
Electronic health records (EHRs) are complex systems with direct effects on the documentation and 
coordination of care and indirect effects on process efficiency, quality of care, staff satisfaction, and 
hospital finances. In addition, EHRs are increasingly integrated, that is, they connect and require 
alignment among departments, specialties, staff groups, work processes, and so forth. To achieve this 
integration EHRs include many facilities. Thus, the functionality of one EHR corresponds to that of 
many paper records and legacy systems. The complexity and integration make it a major investment 
and daunting task for a hospital to implement an EHR [1, 2]. In this study we focus on one EHR – 
Epic – and compare three cases that are at different stages in the implementation process.  
Epic is an integrated suite of software with functionality ranging from patient administration, through 
systems for physicians, nurses, pharmacists, radiologists, lab technologist, and other care providers, to 
billing systems, integration to the primary health sector, and a facility for granting patients access to 
their own data. Being originally developed for the US market, Epic has only recently been 
implemented in Europe. Our cases are from three European countries. In the UK, Epic went live at 
Cambridge University Hospitals in October 2014 and after a troubled start they have reached the state 
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of routine use. In Denmark, Epic went live at Herlev and Gentofte Hospital in May 2016 and two 
years later the transition is still ongoing. In Norway, the Health Platform program in Central Norway 
is responsible for the procurement and implementation of Epic. The implementation is planned to start 
in 2021. We contend that these three cases are illustrative, in particular the implementation in the UK 
was the first Epic implementation in Europe and the implementation in Denmark is the primary source 
of learning for the implementation in Norway. However, we acknowledge that Epic has been 
implemented in additional European countries. 
While any implementation is shaped by the particulars of the local context [3], experiences from 
existing Epic implementations provide insights valuable to the research community and to hospitals 
contemplating to implement Epic. A concrete motivation for the present study is to inform the 
preparations of the upcoming Epic implementation in Norway. We specifically ask: 
 How did the hospitals prepare for go-live and how did the UK and Danish experiences after go-
live match their expectations? 
 How did experiences from previous Epic implementations, such as those in the UK and Denmark, 
inform the Norwegian preparations? 
It is generally recognized that the period immediately following the go-live of an EHR is stressful and 
associated with a productivity dip. Priestman et al. [1] find that, depending on the productivity 
parameter, it normally takes 6-12 months to return to baseline productivity. For Epic the stress level at 
go-live is further increased by the big-bang implementation strategy endorsed by the Epic company. 
The longer-term benefits of EHRs include better documentation, fewer medical errors, and improved 
interdisciplinary collaboration [1]. However, these benefits are often accompanied by an increase in 
the amount of time spent on documentation, especially by physicians [4]. This increase is contrary to 
their wishes because physicians already spend a substantial amount of their time on documentation [5] 
and would like to spend less time on documentation in order to have more face time with patients [6]. 
2 Method 
We answer the research questions through document analysis and interviews. Projects the size of Epic 
implementations are subject to scrutiny from health authorities, which document their assessments in 
reports. Such reports form the main input for our analyses of the UK [7, 8] and Danish [9] cases. In 
addition, selected project documents are publicly available from the Danish [10, 11, 12] and 
Norwegian [13] cases. For the Norwegian case we have also interviewed six representatives of top 
management in the Health Platform program. These interviews, conducted in October to December 
2018, focused on potentials and challenges with Epic and also included reflections on the Epic 
implementation in Denmark. Given the top-management interviewees, the interviews were conducted 
in an open-ended manner, which provided the interviewees with the opportunity to organize their 
answers within their own frameworks [14]. We contend that this increased the validity of the 
responses. 
The interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and analyzed by identifying common themes across 
the interviewees and by contrasting interviewee statements with the findings from the UK and Danish 
cases. In quotes, the interviewed managers are denoted Manager-1, Manager-2 and so forth where the 
numbers indicate the order in which they are quoted in the text for the first time. For all three cases, 
media coverage provides supplementary input. 
3 The UK Case: Cambridge University Hospitals 
Epic went live at Cambridge University Hospitals (CUH) on October 26, 2014, eighteen months after 
the contract between CUH and Epic was signed. The contract amounted to £200 million (EUR 275 
million) and involved the implementation of Epic all across CUH, which had 1486 beds, 8930 staff (in 
full-time equivalents), and an outpatient attendance (July 2014 - June 2015) of 1,336,900 [8]. Prior to 
the Epic implementation CUH was minimally digital; it had received a rating of Stage 1 on the 
Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model (EMRAM), whose stages range from 0 to 7 [15]. That is, 
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some ancillary systems were digital but all other records were paper-based. The vision for Epic was to 
replace paper records with one integrated electronic health record that spanned all clinical areas, 
including intensive care, anesthesia, and the laboratories. As a consequence, the implementation of 
Epic included the installation of about 6750 personal computers, 500 laptops, and 395 workstations on 
wheels. In addition, the implementation entailed the training of about 12000 staff. 
The implementation followed the big-bang approach endorsed by Epic, that is, CUH went live all at 
once rather than in phases. In the period immediately after go-live CUH experienced a number of 
problems [15, 16]: 
 Incomplete access to patients’ medical history because the paper-to-Epic transfer had not been 
completed. 
 Disruption to pathology services caused by problems with specimen label printers. 
 A four-hour period of unplanned downtime requiring the diversion of all ambulances to other 
hospitals. 
 Problems with the delivery of pathology test results, leading to difficulties in matching results to 
patients. 
 A several-day period of instability of one of the transfusion system interfaces. 
 Disruptions in the consistency of care, including venous thromboembolism assessments, nursing 
care plans, and the completion of discharge summaries. 
 A 20% drop in emergency department performance and large productivity decreases in outpatient 
clinics. 
Six months after go-live (in April 2015) the Care Quality Commission carried out an inspection of 
CUH. The inspection report [7] rated CUH services “inadequate” on four out of six parameters: 
overall, safety, responsiveness, and well-ledness. With respect to effectiveness CUH services received 
a “requires improvement” rating. The only positive rating was a rating of “outstanding” with respect to 
whether services were caring. While staff shortages contributed to the inadequacies, the report also 
explicitly mentioned Epic as a contributor: 
 Epic was beginning to be embedded into practice but it was “still having an impact on patient care 
and relationships with external professionals” [7, p. 3]. 
 Limitations in Epic meant that medicines were not always prescribed correctly. 
 Problems with Epic made it difficult for staff to follow required guidelines. 
 Although CUH participated in most audits, Epic had made it more difficult to collect audit data. 
 Epic had negatively affected CUH’s ability to “report, highlight and take action on data” [7, p. 3]. 
The cost of the Epic implementation also contributed to an overspending of about £1.2 million a week. 
As a result of the inspection and the financial difficulties, CUH was placed in special measures in 
September 2015 and its chief executive had to resign [17]. In motivating these steps it was argued that 
in some of CUH’s services “patient safety and welfare was placed at risk” [17, p. 1]. That is, about a 
year after go-live CUH was experiencing multiple and severe difficulties, rather than reaping benefits 
from its Epic implementation. 
The Care Quality Commission carried out a second inspection at CUH in September 2016 [8], about 
two years after Epic went live. At this point CUH services had improved to a rating of “good”, except 
with respect to responsiveness, which was rated as “requires improvement”. With explicit reference to 
Epic the inspection report stated that: 
“Records were contemporaneous and complete. Staff had easy access to clinical records. Since our last 
inspection a significant number of modifications had been made to the electronic record system and 
concerns we had raised previously had been addressed.” [8, p. 7] 
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The improvements were partly due to CUH staff’s increased familiarity with Epic but also included 
the integration of all patient administrative and clinical information. With Epic the paper records were 
eliminated and, thus, no longer had to be retrieved whenever they were needed. This elimination alone 
saved CUH an estimated £460,000 a year in staff time [15]. Furthermore, all patients wore barcoded 
wristbands linked to Epic, thereby improving patient safety by reducing the risk of misidentification. 
In total, Epic and the initiatives associated with it had moved CUH to Stage 6 on EMRAM [15]. 
4 The Danish Case: Herlev and Gentofte Hospital 
Epic went live at Herlev and Gentofte Hospital (HGH) on May 21, 2016. The implementation was the 
first in a series of implementations that rolled out Epic at all hospitals in two of the five healthcare 
regions in Denmark. The implementation of Epic at HGH followed the big-bang approach, and so did 
the implementations at the other hospitals in the two regions. In-between these big-bang 
implementations there were periods for learning and adjustments. The last hospitals in the roll-out 
started to use Epic in November 2017. The contract for the full implementation in the two regions was 
signed in December 2013 and amounted to DKK 2.8 billion (EUR 375 million), thereby making it the 
largest IT investment in Danish healthcare [9]. We analyze the implementation of Epic at the first 
hospital in the series of implementations, HGH. 
HGH had 949 beds, 6449 staff, and an annual outpatient attendance of about 742,600. Prior to the 
implementation of Epic it was estimated that HGH was at Stage 3 on EMRAM [11]. That is, ancillary 
systems (most notably the laboratory and radiology systems) were digital and fed data to a clinical 
data repository, which also included most nursing documentation; the remaining records were a mix of 
paper forms and digital systems. The vision for Epic was to eliminate paper records and replace many 
existing clinical information systems with one integrated electronic health record [10]. In Epic this 
included the intensive-care and anesthetics module as well as the medicine module. In addition, 
integrations to the above-mentioned ancillary systems were established. It was expected that the main 
benefits of Epic would be more efficient patient administration and clinical processes. To achieve 
these benefits Epic had to be adjusted to match the Danish healthcare context. These adjustments 
involved changes in the user interface as well as the underlying functionality.  
HGH experienced a number of problems after go-live. A status report in August 2016 compiled the 
problems that had transpired during the first three month with Epic [12]: 
 The number of adverse events and incidents at HGH increased after go-live; in two cases patients 
suffered injury as a result of Epic. 
 Referrals, admission reports, discharge reports, and epicrises were not sent correctly due to 
technical problems. 
 The identity of unnamed newborn babies was difficult to establish because they appeared as 
‘Unknown’, that is, without their mother’s social security number. 
 The Epic displays in the emergency department caused problems for the staff, who had difficulty 
gaining an overview of the patients and their status. 
 The integration between Epic and some of the medical equipment malfunctioned, so data were not 
transferred from the equipment to the patients’ records in Epic. 
 The integration with the national medicine chart had errors, such as occasional duplication of 
medical orders, thereby creating uncertainty and workarounds.  
 Many blood-test orders remained unsent because they did not comply with new requirements to 
their content, often without the physicians understanding why the order had not been sent or even 
realizing it. 
Problems continued over the following months. As a result the implementation process was assessed 
by Rigsrevisionen, an independent auditing institution under the Danish Parliament, in a report in June 
2018. The report [9] criticized the training, testing, benefits estimation, and benefits follow-up: 
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Training in the use of Epic started two weeks later than planned, that is, six weeks before go-live. The 
compressed schedule was caused by the delayed completion of training materials and, in turn, caused 
problems completing the training of all staff. The training materials were delayed by adjustments to 
Epic. In the end, adjustments to Epic continued after training had started and many users received 
training in a training environment dissimilar from the system they met at go-live. In a small survey a 
month after go-live only one of the 149 respondents felt adequately prepared for starting to use Epic; 
the pre-set target level was 80% [9]. 
The testing of Epic also started later than planned. Critical technical tests were not made until a week 
before go-live because the features to be tested were delayed. The tests were complicated by known 
errors that had not yet been fixed and they identified new errors, including 20 in the categories critical 
and severe. These 20 errors were not fixed until after go-live. Specifically, the test of whether Epic 
produced the same data for reimbursement as the old systems was conducted the day before go-live 
and revealed problems; it was decided not to compare the data produced by Epic with those from the 
old systems. In addition, the functional test of whether Epic fulfilled the specified requirements was 
postponed until October, five months after go-live. That is, at go-live HGH had incomplete knowledge 
about defects. When conducted the functional test revealed 196 defects [9]. 
The benefits estimation in the business case [10] concluded that the financial benefits of Epic would 
surpass the investment no later than in 2022. Central to this estimate was an expectation that the 
productivity dip after go-live would only last three weeks [9]: 50% during the first two weeks and 
25% during the third week. The basis for this optimistic expectation is unclear, for example a draft 
version of the business case [11] predicted a productivity dip for the remainder of the year in which 
Epic went live. Possibly, the estimated three-week productivity dip was partly a strategic decision to 
maintain pressure on HGH to return to baseline productivity. As much as 18 months after go-live 
productivity had not yet returned to baseline [9]. 
Benefits follow-up was put on hold in May 2017 due to defects in the facilities for extracting follow-up 
data from Epic. These report facilities was an area that received limited focus during testing and it was 
subsequently (September 2017) necessary to suspend nearly half of the 750 reports because they had 
turned out to be invalid in a Danish healthcare context [9]. In addition, data about the baseline 
productivity were not available for 20 of the 26 productivity measures identified for follow-up. At the 
time of Rigsrevisionen’s assessment, two years after go-live, it remained uncertain to what extent 
productivity was still lagging behind baseline and to what extent the lag was an artifact of imprecise 
follow-up data [9]. Epic had not yet transitioned from stressful implementation to effective and 
efficient routine use. 
5 The Norwegian Case: The Health Platform 
The Health Platform is a regional program owned by the Central Norway Regional Health Authority 
and Trondheim municipality. It aims to acquire and implement Epic for the whole region, including all 
the hospitals, general practitioners (GPs), nursing homes, and home-care services. By including the 
municipalities, the health authorities want to stage the Health Platform as a pilot for the long-term 
national goal of establishing a common EHR functionality for Norway across the different regions and 
services, "one citizen - one record" [18]. 
The Central Norway region includes 40,000 healthcare professionals and an approximate population 
of 720,000. There are 3 hospitals whereof the largest is the university hospital, St Olav’s Hospital, 
located in Trondheim with approximately 1000 beds and 10,500 employees. St Olav’s Hospital is 
already at a high level of digitization but many of the existing laboratory systems will be replaced by 
Epic’s laboratory system (except pathology and medical genetics, which will require integration). In 
addition, the intensive-care and anesthetics module and the medicine module will be implemented. 
The level of digitization varies substantially across the GPs, nursing homes, and home-care services, 
where particularly the GPs already have well-working systems at their disposal. The cost of the 
program amounts to NOK 2.7 billion (EUR 270 million) [19]. 
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Out of 11 prequalified EHR vendors in 2016, Epic is now left as the only contender. Negotiations are 
currently under way on what the solution should consist of and on how to proceed with the 
implementation. The signing of the contract is planned for 2019 and the first implementation for 2021. 
Trondheim municipality will be in the first implementation, while the rest of the 84 municipalities in 
Central Norway have the option to buy in to the solution after that. 
According to Manager-1 the preparation process for “mapping of integrations, migration work and 
standardization” has been more thorough than what has proven to be the case in Denmark. Moreover, 
from early on, extensive user participation has been identified as crucial to the success of the program, 
both for creating ownership to Epic and for ensuring a well-working functionality. This was 
underscored by one of the managers: 
“When we started the acquisition project, we involved 400 clinicians from the entire healthcare service in 
Central Norway, small and large municipalities and hospitals […] They participated in 101 workshops and 
described what was good with the current ICT systems, their current challenges, and what was missing” 
(Manager-2) 
The outcome of these workshops became the basis for the requirements specification, which included 
4000 specific requirements.  
Another crucial point in the preparations is to ensure that the municipalities buy in to the Epic solution 
as early as possible in order to create stability and predictability around the solution. The managers 
recognize the municipalities’ point of view and that it is different from that of the hospitals:  
“A challenge is that the program is very hospital-run. It is the Central Norway Regional Health Authority that 
owns the program. Even if Trondheim municipality participates, the main effort is to acquire an EHR for Central 
Norway, and we feel that we must ensure that the municipalities are taken into account” (Manager-3) 
A strategy for accommodating the needs of the municipalities has been to involve their user 
representatives in the acquisition process. The purpose of this involvement has been to assure these 
representatives that Epic can be adapted to the needs of the various user groups in the municipalities. 
A recent arrangement with the Norwegian state ensures that each of the municipalities may finance the 
investment costs through a loan from the Norwegian Government.  
So far, the negotiations between the Health Platform and Epic have been promising: 
“We had a very thorough dialogue with Epic in the spring of 2018. In this period, we experienced that they 
really improved their understanding of what we wanted. In this situation, we also experienced that they brought 
with them know-how and knowledge from Denmark and Finland that was useful in Norway” (Manager-4) 
Like in the Danish case, designated clinicians are supposed to be heavily engaged in configuring Epic, 
that is, in designing functionality for their practice. In the Epic world, these clinicians are called 
“physician builders” and reflect the promise of future work processes in which the technology is 
closely embedded in clinical practices. The physician builders are to take part in configuring the initial 
Epic setup and in a subsequent regional organization that should continue to work on optimizing and 
streamlining key work processes. The physician builders will have these activities as their full-time 
work. In addition, so-called clinical builders (a kind of super users) will be recruited to work part-time 
with Epic together with their clinical work. User participation in general and physician/clinical 
builders in particular are considered crucial in the startup phase. An essential reason for this is the 
rigid way in which Epic runs implementation projects:  
"They have a very rigid and tight project plan. They have the philosophy of: let’s just get the solution up and 
running and let’s build the capability in the organization to understand the solution and its possibilities" 
(Manager-5) 
In this process, it is of utmost importance that the customer has available resources that can take part 
in the process and decision-makers that can make decisions on what the configured system shall look 
like. According to Epic policies these decisions must typically be made within a 10-day deadline. If 
the customer fails to meet the deadline, Epic will set up the system with the "foundation" functionality, 
that is, with the default functionality that appears to be the best fit to the current situation. 
The Health Platform managers express that the user communities in Denmark were only involved in 
the implementation process to a lesser degree and that there was to a lesser degree an established 
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decision structure, that is, people with a mandate from the line organization to make decisions. This 
resulted in what the Health Platform managers refer to as a “consensus model”. Accordingly, many 
decisions were delayed and Epic, therefore, defaulted to the foundation setup in these areas. Another 
lesson learned is that a tailored Epic system depends on the involvement of various types of technical 
analysts and physician builders in the setup phase. They are actually building the system. The tight 
schedule, an absent decision or an unforeseen workload may prevent the builders from completing 
their work on time. The Health Platform is working hard to ensure that these problems do not happen 
in Norway:  
"Now we are in the process of establishing a decision structure [...] that is, involve people from the line 
organizations who can contribute to responding to all the questions that need to be responded to on a very short 
notice [10 days]. Epic will probably raise something like 8000-12000 questions when they start the 
implementation" (Manager-2). 
After the implementation, the physician builders and analysts are supposed to continue improving and 
optimizing Epic, while the vendor will be involved to a lesser extent. 
The Health Platform expects many long-term effects from the program, particularly related to a 
healthcare service that is better integrated within the hospital and among the hospitals, municipalities 
and GPs. This also includes the standardization of work processes and will require some disciplining 
of the clinicians in their daily use of Epic. This disciplining might constitute a serious challenge. The 
Health Platform works to handle this challenge by informing the line organizations about how 
practices will be affected. Overall, the long-term effects are first and foremost related to quality 
improvements. In comparison to the Danish case, the Health Platform has no business case that 
promotes concrete economic gains. Still, there exist internal calculations on potential economic effects 
that might occur if things go as planned. 
6 Discussion 
The period after Epic went live was wrought with problems in the UK and Denmark. In the UK it took 
roughly the 6-12 months estimated by Priestman et al. [1] before productivity had returned to baseline. 
In Denmark it had not yet happened after 18 months, in spite of the expectation that the productivity 
dip would last for only three weeks. For many months both CUH and HGH experienced disruptions in 
the continuity of care due to, among other things, malfunctions in the interfaces between Epic and 
other clinical systems. At HGH training and testing were severely incomplete at go-live. Nevertheless, 
CUH and HGH chose against delaying go-live. In Norway the preparations aim to ensure a smoother 
implementation process but several points are worth noting: 
First, the organizational complexity of the Norwegian case is higher than that of the UK and Danish 
cases, which are restricted to hospitals. In Norway, Epic will be implemented throughout a region, that 
is, in its hospitals as well as in the GP clinics, nursing homes, and home-care services of its 84 
municipalities. In total, this represents several hundred sites. While the inclusion of the municipalities 
may increase the possibilities for streamlining and transforming regional healthcare, it also makes the 
users more heterogeneous and the implementation more challenging to manage. 
Second, the organization set up to conduct the implementation is in an uneasy position between Epic 
and the clinicians. The interviewed Norwegian top managers appear somewhat worried by the tight 
deadlines enforced by Epic. At the same time they emphasize the importance of widespread user 
participation to create ownership and get the functionality right. This double pressure on the 
implementation organization leaves little room for it to be proactive and may create the kind of 
environment that leads to compressed training schedules, postponed testing, and frustrated staff. 
Third, the Norwegian case relies on the creation of an extensive formal decision structure with a 
strong foothold among the clinicians. This decision structure is expected to curb the risk associated 
with the big-bang implementation of Epic. While the need for such a decision structure appears to be 
one of the key lessons the Norwegians draw from the Danish case, this decision structure has yet to be 
created and may remain wavery. At the same time it is not evident that a more formal decision 
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structure would have improved matters in the Danish case; some Danish clinicians find that the 
decision structure has been too top-down – too inattentive to local voices.  
Fourth, similar to the Danish case, it is crucial that Epic can be adapted to the Norwegian healthcare 
context. This requires the recruitment of a large number of clinicians who are committed to this kind 
of work. In Denmark, a team of 70 physician builders is already considered insufficient. A potential 
challenge in recruiting physicians is that their clinical career path is relatively fixed and does not 
include IT. While a new type of profession may be established in this area as suggested by one of the 
Norwegian top managers, physicians have historically not participated extensively in large-scale EHR 
projects [20]. The prestige of such a new profession may, however, increase with the strengthened 
medical focus on IT, illustrated by the introduction of chief medical informatics officers (CMIOs). 
Fifth, the UK and Danish cases demonstrate that the need for configurations and adaptations does not 
end at go-live. However, far-reaching decisions about the standardization of routines and processes 
have to be reached in a complex decision structure and implemented before go-live. It is an open 
question to what extent it will be practically possible to make larger configurations once these 
decisions have been made. While Epic is promoted as a flexible platform, the setup with many initial, 
far-reaching regional decisions may “freeze” practices and technology in a way that makes them hard 
to change later. One step toward such an outcome is seen in the Danish case where the physician 
builders have had less freedom to configure Epic than they initial expected because such freedom is at 
odds with overall standardization strategy. 
Finally, the benefits estimation in the Danish case has been sharply criticized by Rigsrevisionen. This 
criticism has not gone unnoticed in the Health Platform program, and a lesson learned from this 
appears to be that the Norwegians are careful not to promote measurable benefits related to economy 
and efficiency at this stage in the project. Instead, the promoted benefits relate to higher treatment 
quality and better coordination between hospital care and municipal care. 
7 Conclusion 
Judging from the UK and Danish cases, the implementation of Epic in Norway will be a challenge. 
Experiences from, especially, the Danish case appear to have considerable influence on the Norwegian 
Health Platform program. However, these experiences identify more challenges than solutions and the 
preparations for the Norwegian implementation of Epic is therefore currently in a state of considerable 
uncertainty. In future work we will continue to compare European implementations of Epic. 
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Summary table 
What was already known about the topic: 
 The implementation of electronic health records requires careful preparations 
 Previous implementation experiences are valuable sources of learning 
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 Big-bang implementations are risky but preferred by vendors such as Epic 
 
What this study added to our knowledge: 
 The documented experiences from the UK and Danish implementations of Epic identify more 
challenges than solutions and are therefore not straightforward to learn from 
 The Norwegian preparations are in a state of considerable uncertainty, caused by high complexity, 
double pressures, and the need for simultaneously adapting Epic and many clinical work processes 
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